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Lawrance (1991) has shown, through the estimation of consump-
tion Euler equations, that subjective rates of impatience (time prefer-
ence) in the U.S. are three to ￿ve percentage points higher for house-
holds with lower average labor incomes than for those with higher
labor income. From a theoretical perspective, the sign of this corre-
lation in a job-search model seems at ￿rst to be undetermined, since
more impatient workers tend to accept wage o⁄ers that less impatient
workers would not, thereby remaining less time unemployed. The
main result of this paper is showing that, regardless of the existence
of e⁄ects of opposite sign, and independently of the particular spec-
i￿cations of the givens of the model, less impatient workers always
end up, in the long run, with a higher average income. The result is
based on the (unique) invariant Markov distribution of wages associ-
ated with the dynamic optimization problem solved by the consumers.
An example is provided to illustrate the method.
1 Introduction
More impatient workers (those with higher time preference) tend to accept
wage o⁄ers that less impatient workers would not. By these means, their
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1wages, over the employment/unemployment cycles, when they are employed,
tend to be sometimes lower than the minimum wage acceptable by less im-
patient workers. However, when both more impatient and less impatient
workers face the same circumstances, regarding the job market, the former,
for the same reason (having a lower reservation wage), tend to remain less
time unemployed.
Since these two facts have opposite e⁄ects in the determination of the
long-run average wage, the e⁄ect of the time preference parameter on this
variable is at ￿rst not clear from a theoretical perspective.
From an empirical perspective, though, Lawrance (1991) estimated con-
sumption Euler equations using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and
showed that subjective rates of time preferences can be up to 6 percentage
points higher in the top 5 percent of the wage distribution than in the bot-
tom ￿fth percentile. Two possible explanations of such a pattern have been
o⁄ered by this author. First, credit constraints (in which case ￿nancing the
smoothing of consumption during a training period would not be feasible,
leading more impatient consumers to lower investments in human capital);
and, second, the existence of socioeconomic variables which, following this
author, would determine at the same time both a higher impatience and a
lower level of long-run labor income.
Lawrance￿ s result suggests that models describing the long-run dynamics
of the job market should be able to deliver, at least for some speci￿cations
of the distribution of wage o⁄ers and for some values of the parameters, a
negative correlation between average labor income and impatience. In this
paper I use a modi￿ed version of McCall￿ s (1976) classical model of job search
to show that, actually, less impatient workers always end up better o⁄in the
long-run, regarding the average wage, than more impatient workers. The
conclusion does not depend on particular speci￿cations of the givens of the
model. The two e⁄ects of opposite sign to which I have referred before,
therefore, happen to have one dominated by the other.
I show these facts by calculating, as a function of the time-preference
parameter, the invariant Markovian distribution of the labor income of a
given worker (which also coincides with the Markovian distribution of wages
in the economy as a whole) and ￿nding the average wage (of a given worker)
under this distribution.
2 The Model
The givens of the problem, known by all maximizing agents, are a non-
degenerated distribution of wage o⁄ers, from which workers make indepen-
2dent draws, a probability of being laid o⁄each period; and a probability, also
each period, of not having a (new) wage o⁄er.
The basic model presented here, except for the fact that I am considering
a probability ￿ that the worker does not get a job o⁄er next period, is the
same as Stokey and Lucas￿ s (1989, c. 10) version of McCall￿ s model. The
reader should refer to this source for the demonstrations marked below as
standard.
Our group of workers are indexed by [0;1]: For all purposes, one can think
of a small country in which workers receive their job o⁄ers from foreign ￿rms.
Consider the measurable space (￿;F;p) and, in this space, the measure





; denote by F(t) the distribution function
that (q ￿ a:e: -uniquely) determines the measure q : F(t) = p(w ￿ t): The
distribution F(:) satis￿es:
Ew > 0 (1)
The (representative) worker is not allowed to borrow or to lend. His
consumption ct is equal to his income wt in each period. The consumer
maximizes the expected present value of consumption E (
P1
t=0 btct): By as-
sumption:
0 < b < 1 (2)
State \w" corresponds to a job o⁄er w at hand, and state \0" to no job o⁄er
that period. In state w the worker can accept or turn down the o⁄er. If he
accepts it, by assumption he is employed with that wage, facing, each period,
a probability of unemployment given by ￿; 0 < ￿ ￿ 1: If he does not accept
the o⁄er he will be this period in state 0: Being in state zero the only thing
he can do is wait next period for a possible job o⁄er (which happens with
probability 1 ￿ ￿, 0 ￿ ￿ < 1: The compensation wage he receives when in
state zero is considered to be negligible and left out of the model. While
employed, the individual is not allowed to search for wage o⁄ers.
With v(w) stating for the value function when the state is "wage o⁄er w at
hand", A for accept and R for reject, the recursive version of the consumer￿ s
problem is given by:
v(w) = max
A,R



















Proposition 1 There is a unique bounded continuous and weakly increasing
function v(.) satisfying (3).
Proof. Standard.
Proposition 2 There is a unique ￿ w 2 [0;D] such that:
v(w) =
(
v(0) (= ￿ w + ￿v(0)) if w ￿ ￿ w
w+￿￿v(0)
1￿￿(1￿￿) if w > ￿ w (5)
Proof. Standard.








0 ￿ ￿ w)dF(w
0) (6)































Next, add and subtract
R
[ ￿ w;D] ￿ wdF(w0) to the second member of the equation
above and collect terms to get (6).
Proposition 4 The reservation wage is an increasing function of the worker￿ s
patience (￿); a decreasing function of the probability of ￿nding no job o⁄ers
in the next period (￿) and a decreasing function of the probability of layo⁄ ￿:
4Proof. The second and third assertions follow immediately from (6).
Regarding the ￿rst one, de￿ne:
G(￿ w;￿) = ￿ w ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)




0 ￿ ￿ w)dF(w
0)
and observe that G ￿ w = 1 > 0 and G￿ < 0: The result ￿ w0(￿) > 0 follows
(under (1) and (2)) from the implicit function theorem.
3 A Trivial Case
We have seen above that there are two e⁄ects of opposite sign determining
the long run average wage. On the one hand, the fact that more patient
workers do not accept o⁄ers that less patient workers sometimes do. This
point acts in favor of the average wage of more patient workers. On the other
hand, by not accepting these low o⁄ers, more patient workers end up being
unemployed at times when less patient workers, with equivalent o⁄ers, get
the job. This acts against the average wage of more patient workers.
Now suppose that the probability of unemployment (￿) is equal to zero
(to simplify, assume the same for ￿; even though it is not necessary for the
argument). Then, in the limit, the second e⁄ect does not exist anymore
and, therefore, it should be trivial proving that more patient workers end up
better o⁄ in the average. This is done in this section, just for the purpose of
enhancing the intuition about the problem.
Since in the next section the general demonstration is carried out with
a distribution function that happens to have a density, here I prove the
result, for a change (in which turns out to be an analytically less comfortable
setting), assuming a discrete distribution. A single application of the law
of large numbers su¢ ces (the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem can be used in this
case1).
Proposition 5 Consider two economies, 1 and 2, each one operating under
the rules of the model presented in section 2, with ￿ = ￿ = 0: In economy
j, j = 1;2; all workers have a time-preference parameter equal to ￿j;with
￿2 > ￿1. Wage o⁄ers are given by measure q: Suppose that the wages in the
support of q are indexed in nondecreasing order:
0 = w1 ￿ :::wa1￿1 ￿ wa1 ￿ wa2 ￿ :::wax ￿ ::: ￿ wan = D (7)
1See, e.g., Ferguson (1996, p. 23)
5Denote the probability masses on these points, respectively, by q1;:::qa1￿1;qa1;:::;qax;:::qan:
Then, the average wage (wA) of the workers in economy 2 will be no less than
the average wage in economy 1 (wA2 ￿ wA1).
Proof. Make A(j) = [ ￿ w(j);D]; where ￿ w(j) is the reservation wage of
economy j: Since the n-th highest draw among n draws from measure q
(which has its support contained in the compact set [0;D]) converges in
measure to D; after a certain number of draws all workers, in each economy
j, can be considered to be employed with a wage w 2 A(j): Suppose that
the wages in the support of q are indexed in nondecreasing order:
w1 ￿ :::wa1￿1 ￿ wa1 ￿ wa2 ￿ :::wax ￿ ::: ￿ wan (8)
Call wa1(1) is the ￿rst wage no less than the reservation wage of economy
1 ( ￿ w(1)); meaning, that a1 (1) satis￿es wa1 ￿ ￿ w(1) ￿ wa1￿1: After a certain
number of draws the average wage in economy 1 (wA(1)) can be considered










Since by assumption ￿2 > ￿1; and since the reservation wage, by Proposition
2 (with ￿ = ￿ = 0), is an increasing function of ￿; we can make ￿ w(2) =
￿ w(1) + ￿￿ w where ￿￿ w ￿ 0: Therefore, in economy 2, either it still happens
that wa1 ￿ ￿ w(2) = ￿ w(1)+￿ ￿ w ￿ wa1￿1; in which case the average wage in the






In this second case, the average wage in economy 2 is no less than the average

















which is true by (8).
Although illustrative, this example is a simple consequence of the fact
that ￿ w(2) ￿ ￿ w(1). This implies that after the draws have been taken by all
workers in each economy one is actually averaging two groups of numbers,
the ￿rst of which has a lower bound no greater than the second. This trivially
implies wA(2) ￿ wA(1):
64 The General Case
The transition dynamics in this section draws upon a similar problem ana-
lyzed by Stokey and Lucas (1989, c. 10).
The reservation wage ￿ w(j) divides [0;D] into two regions: the acceptance
region A(￿) = [￿ w(￿);D] and the non-acceptance region Ac(￿) = [0; ￿ w(￿)]:
The rules of the optimization followed by the worker de￿ne a transition
function P : [0;D] ￿ BD ! [0;1]: If the current state (given by the wage
o⁄er) is w 2 Ac, the probability of having an o⁄er next period in any borelian
B ￿ [0;D] is given by (1 ￿ ￿)q(B) + ￿, if 0 2 B; and (1 ￿ ￿)q(B) if 0 = 2 B:
Alternatively, if the current state is w 2 A; the worker can only lose his job
(with probability ￿) or keep the same wage next period. Therefore, with
probability zero he will have a wage next period in a borelian B that does
not contain either 0 or w: If the borelian B contains 0; but not w; or w
but not zero, the transition probabilities are, respectively, ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿: If it
contains both, since these are disjoint events (because 0 = 2 A), P(w;B) = 1.
This transition function implies the only ergodic set of the problem to be the
whole (induced) sample space, [0;D]:
Let ￿([0;D],B[0;D]) denote the space of probability measures de￿ned in
([0;D],B[0;D]). Consider a new measure ￿t in ([0;D],B[0;D]); representing the





P(w;B)￿(dw); ￿ 2 ￿; B 2 B[0;D] (9)
￿([0;D];B[0;D]), when endowed with the total variation norm, is a complete
metric space.
In order to talk about an invariant distribution of wages in this economy,
it is necessary to show that the distribution of wage o⁄ers has one and only
one ￿xed point under the operator T ￿: For the demonstration of this im-
portant point it su¢ ces, by the contraction theorem, proving that, for some
N ￿ 1; T ￿N is a contraction in the metric space ￿([0;D],B[0;D]). Indeed,
since ￿([0;D],B[0;D]) is a complete metric space, if T ￿N can be shown to be
a contraction, by the N-stage contraction theorem (see Corolary 2 of theo-
rem 3.2 in Stokey and Lucas), T ￿ admits one and only one ￿xed point in
￿([0;D],B[0;D]).
Proving that T ￿N is a contraction, therefore, is the only thing we have
to do here. This can be easily done with the help of Lemma 11.11 and
exercise 11.5a in Stokey and Lucas (1989). Following these results, for T ￿N
to be a contraction in ￿([0;D],B[0;D]) it su¢ ces to show that there exists
7a point w0 2 [0;D]; an integer N ￿ 1; and a number ￿ > 0; such that
P N(w;fw0g) > ￿ for all w 2 [0;D]:
Proposition 6 The adjoint operator T ￿ of the transition function P de￿ned
above has one and only one unique ￿xed point. This ￿xed point is the invari-
ant measure of wage o⁄ers de￿ned in ([0;D],B[0;D]) by (9).
Proof. Take N = 2 and w0 = 0: From what we saw about the tran-
sition function P, there are two cases to consider: if w 2 A = [￿ w;D],
P 2(w;fw0g) = ￿mw(Ac) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿: Alternatively, if w 2 Ac = [0; ￿ w);





c) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿; mw(A
c)mw(A
c) + mw(A)￿g
Then, ￿ > 0 and P N(w;fw0g) = P 2(w;f0g) > ￿; all w 2 [0;D]: This proves
that T ￿N is a contraction. The result then follows from the N-stage contrac-
tion theorem. The second assertion follows by de￿nition.
The next step is deriving the limiting measure of the state of the economy,
particularly for sets C ￿ A (of employed workers).
A worker, in period t + 1; is employed with wage w 2 C; if and only if
he was unemployed and got a wage o⁄er w 2 C or he was already employed
with wage w in the beginning of period t + 1 and kept his job. Given the
assumed independence of job o⁄ers in each period, we can write
￿t+1(C) = ￿t(A
c)(1 ￿ ￿)q(C) + ￿t(C)(1 ￿ ￿) (10)
The determination of the long-run measure ￿(C) = limt!1￿t(C) requires
the calculation of ￿t(Ac): Since a worker is unemployed in period t+1 i⁄ he
was already unemployed and drew a wage o⁄er in Ac or was employed and




c) + ￿] + ￿t(A)￿ (11a)
Taking limits, equation (11a) trivially implies ￿(Ac) = ￿=[￿ + q(A)(1 ￿ ￿)]:




￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)q(A)
We are now ready to calculate the average wage in each cohort j of the





￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)q(A)
(12)
8where ￿ w(￿) follows (6).
Consistently with the observation we have made before, that there are
two e⁄ects of opposite sign determining the e⁄ect on wA; when ￿ is allowed
to change, it is not clear from (12), at ￿rst glance, if the average wage is
an increasing function of the time-preference parameter or not. Indeed, as ￿
increases, so does the reservation wage, leading to a fall of q(A): At the same
time, though, the region of integration in (12) increases.
Proposition 7 below delivers the main result of this paper, for the case in
which F(w) is absolutely continuous.
Remark 1 2F 0(w) exists and is absolutely continuous a.e. in [0;B]; with
F 0(w) ￿ f(w) > 0 for (q ￿ a:e) all w in [0;D]:
Proposition 7 Under Remark 1, the average wage is an increasing function
of the time preference parameter ￿:
Proof. Using the distribution function F and its respective density func-
tion (f(w)) with respect to the Lebesgue measure in R; it follows from the
result above that the average wage is now given by:
wA(￿) =
(1 ￿ ￿)




In the following I omit the argument ￿ in the functions. Taking the derivative




f(￿ w)(1 ￿ ￿)(
R
[ ￿ w;D](w ￿ ￿ w)f(w)dw + ￿ w[￿￿ + ￿(1 ￿ F(￿ w)])
(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(￿ w))2




f(￿ w)(1 ￿ ￿)￿ w(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(￿ w)]
2 > 0 (14)





@￿: The result follows from (14) and Proposi-
ton 2.
2Remember the de￿nition of F(w) as the distribution function determined by q.
9Example 1 Consider an economy in which, each period, workers face a
probability ￿ of layo⁄ and a probability ￿ of having no wage o⁄er next period.
Suppose that q is the Lebesgue measure in [0;1]: Using (6):
￿ w(￿) =
"










By (12), the average wage reads:
wA(￿ w(￿)) =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ w2)
2[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ w)]
(16)
To obtain the sign of ￿ w0(￿) in (15) make z(￿) =
1￿￿(￿￿￿)
￿(1￿￿) ; and note that
￿ w(z(￿)) = h(z) = z￿
p
z2 ￿ 1: Use the chain rule and the fact that h0(z) < 0
for z > 1 (as it happens to be the case) and z0(￿) < 0 to get ￿ w0(￿) > 0:
Use the chain rule again to conclude that to show that w0
A(￿ w(￿)) > 0 su¢ ces
showing that w0
A(￿ w); at the value of ￿ w endogenously determined by ￿ (note
that, accordingly, in the demonstration of Proposition 3 we had to use the
expression for ￿ w as a function of ￿); is strictly positive as well:








1￿￿ ￿ w + 1
i
2[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ w)]
2
Make g(w) = w2 ￿
2(￿+1￿￿)
1￿￿ w + 1: Note that w0
A(￿ w) > 0 if g(￿ w(￿)) > 0: But
g(￿ w) has only one root between zero and one, which is given by:
￿ w1 =





￿ + 1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
)2 ￿ 1
Since g00(￿ w) = 2 > 0; all we have to prove is that ￿ w(￿) < ￿ w1 (this implies
g(￿ w(￿)) > 0): This can be done with the help of the function h(z) de￿ned
above.
Since h0(z) < 0; if we can show that
1￿￿(￿￿￿)
￿(1￿￿) > ￿+1￿￿
1￿￿ (meaning, the z in
the determination of ￿ w(￿) is greater than the z in the determination of ￿ w1)





￿(1￿￿) > 0: The reservation wage
and the long-run average wage for this example are illustrated in Figure 1,
below, ￿rst as a function of beta and teta, with ￿ = 0, and then as a function
of beta and alpha, with ￿ = 0.
10As one can observe from the ￿gure, if theta is very close to zero, the
reservation wage tends to one when ￿ tends to one. Intuitively, the worker
with beta close to one will reject a very big percentage of all o⁄ers, remaining
with a wage equal to zero, whereas the worker with lower beta might accept
and go on keeping his average away from zero. With theta very close to zero,
though, once the patient worker accepts an o⁄er, he remains employed with
that wage for a very very long period of time, eventually catching up with the
less patitent worker and ending up, in the long-run, with a higher average.
Note, also, that the tendency of the reservation wage to get close to one
is reverted when theta increases, but not when alpha increases. When either
alpha or theta increase, both the reservation wage and the average wage de-
crease. The e⁄ect of theta over the reservation wage and over the average
wage, though, is much more noticiable than the e⁄ect of alpha.
5 Conclusions
The empirical evidence provided by Lawrance (1991) has shown that sub-
jective rates of time preferences can be up to 6 percent higher in the top 5
11percent of the income distribution than in the bottom ￿fth percentile. Given
any exogenous distribution of wages, as well as time preferences, probabil-
ity of unemployment and probability of not ￿nding a job o⁄er next period,
I have shown that Lawrance￿ s result can be theoretically supported by the
well known mechanism of an intertemporal job-seach model, even though the
result is not clear at ￿rst glance, due to the existence of two e⁄ects point-
ing out in opposite directions. An example was provided to illustrate the
method.
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